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cific exception rule. This rule dispenses with the need for exceptions where the
error charged is "basic and fundamental." However, there are no adequate
guidelines to determine what errors are "basic and fundamental," which leaves
room for uncertainty in the majority rule's application. Thus, the specific ex-
ception rule is not readily acceptable. The minority view, maintaining that
general exceptions are sufficient, is ably stated by Justice Musmanno's dissent
in the instant case. The argument for this position is that a litigant should not
be penalized for his attorney's failure to specifically except.40 The minority
holding is unacceptable because it discourages counsel from delineating his rea-
sons for objecting; this makes it difficult for the trial judge to analyze the pre-
cise error alleged and if necessary, correct his charge. On balancing the above
considerations, the specific exception rule seems preferable. If coupled with uni-
form jury instructions, an initial charge prior to the introduction of evidence
and/or a clarification of the instances where a general exception will suffice, the
specific exception rule can be endorsed without reservation.
ROBERT P. FINE
CRIMINAL LAW-INSANITY-THE WISCONSIN "EXPERIMENT" WITH
THE ALI TEST
Defendant, after entering a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, was
tried and convicted of arson, burglary and armed robbery in the Circuit Court
of Milwaukee County. The defense offered several alternative tests for criminal
responsibility as instructions to the jury; that of the American Law Institute,'
the test advocated by the British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment,2
the Durham test3 and the Currens test.4 The proposed instructions also included
an instruction which would inform the jury that if the insanity plea was success-
ful the defendant would be mandatorily hospitalized0 until an appropriate mental
40. Instant case at 11, 220 A.2d at 637.
1. Model Penal Code § 4.01 (hereinafter refered to as ALI test); Elements in the
instruction: "lack of substantial capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct or lack of
substantial capacity to conform conduct to the requirements of the law"; State v. Shoffner,
143 N.W.2d at 460 (1966) (hereinafter cited instant case).
2. Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-53 Report, para. 333, at 116 (Cmnd.
No. 8932). Elements in the instruction: "whether accused was suffering from disease of the
mind to such a degree that he ought not to be held responsible," instant case at 460.
3. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Elements in the instruction:
"whether the act is the product of mental illness"; instant case at 460.
4. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961) ; Elements in the instruction:
"lack of substantial capacity to conform conduct to the requirements of the law"; instant
case at 460.
5. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 957.11(3) (1958) which reads in part: "If found not guilty because
insane, or not guilty because feeble minded, the defendant shall be committed to the central
state hospital or to an institution designated by the Department of Public Welfare, there to
be detained, until discharged in accordance with the law." Cf. People v. Lally, 19 N.Y.2d
27, 224 N.E.2d 87, 277 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1966).
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examination determined that he could be released. All of these requested instruc-
tions were denied by the trial court which then instructed the jury on the basis of
the M'Naghten test.6 On appeal to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, held,
reversed, four justices concurring in part, three justices dissenting in part. A
defendant, after presenting evidence that as a result of mental disease or defect
he lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of
the law, may exercise an option to have the jury instructed on the basis of the
American Law Institute test of insanity in place of the M'Naghten test.7 How-
ever, he must first agree to waive the statutory provisions placing the burden of
proof on the state8 and assume that burden himself. The instruction informing
the jury of the status of the defendant after a successful plea of not guilty by
reason of insanity is approved." State v. Skoffner, 31 Wis. 2d 412, 143 N.W.2d
458 (1966).
The defense of insanity, although not unknown in England prior to the
nineteenth century,' 0 reached a stage of modern development with the MWaghten
rule in 1843.11 That test is based primarily on two concepts: the ability of. the
defendant to distinguish right from wrong, and the defendant's knowledge of
the nature and quality of his act.12 Although criticized since its inception,13 the
6. 10 Clark & Fin. 200. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). See State v. Esser, 16 Wis. 2d 567,
599, 115 N.W.2d 505, 522 (abnormal condition of the mind that renders a defendant in-
capable of understanding the nature and quality of his act or incapable of distinguishing
right from wrong).
7. Model Penal Code § 4.01. Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility:(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct,
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law.(2) The terms "mental disease or defect" do not include an abnormality manifested
only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.
8. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 957.11(1) (1958), which provides: "And if the jury finds that the
defendant was insane or feeble minded or that there is a reasonable doubt of his sanity or
mental responsibility at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, they shall find the
defendant not guilty because insane or feeble minded."
9. The court also discussed several other grounds of appeal; alleged error in admitting
defendant's statements into evidence, error on voir dire, failure to prove venue, and failure
to prove arson. The court also held that the exclusionary rule of Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966) would apply to the retrial of the instant case despite the fact that the
first trial took place more than a year before Miranda was decided and despite the United
State Supreme Court's decision holding that Miranda applies only to cases in which the
trial began after June 13, 1966; Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
10. See Biggs, The Guilty Mind 82-111 (1955) ; see also Note, 4 Buffalo L. Rev. 318, 319(1954) (a brief review of the various tests used prior to the M'Naghten formulation).
11. Daniel M'Naghten, in an attempt to assassinate Sir Robert Peel, killed Peel's
secretary Drummond instead. He was later found not guilty on the ground of insanity.
As a result of the public furor that followed the verdict the House of Lords requested the
opinion of the judiciary on the law governing such cases. The resulting opinion is popularly
refered to as the M'Naghten test. 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
12. Id. at 210. Essentially the test declared that there will be no criminal responsibility
if the accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from a disease of the mind, as
not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he
did not know what he was doing was wrong.
13. See 2 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England 154-75 (1883) (an early
analysis and criticism of M'Naghten).
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test received near universal acceptance in England and the United States.14 In
some instances American courts expanded M'Naghten by adding the "irresistable
impulse test" which excuses the defendant when, although he knew the wrong-
fulness of his act, he was incapable of controlling the impulse to commit it.15
Until recently the lone exception to this general acceptance of M'Naghten was
New Hampshire, where a much broader formula was given to the jury: whether
the defendant had the mental capacity to entertain a criminal intent and
whether, in fact, he did entertain such an intent.10 Thus M'Naghten remained,
without serious challenge, the principal test for criminal responsibility until
1954, when the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in the case of
Durham v. United States,17 formulated a test, similar to that of New Hampshire,
declaring that there is no criminal responsibility if the defendant's unlawful act
was the product of a mental disease or defect.' 8 Wisconsin twice rejected the
Durham test,19 the second rejection occurring approximately at the same time
Durham was being radically modified by the District of Columbia court.20 That
court modified Durham stating that the test referred only to abnormal conditions
of the mind which substantially affect mental or emotional processes and sub-
stantially impair behavior control.
Recently other federal courts, while not following Durham, have changed
M'Naghten. In United States v. Currens2l the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
approved a new formula which declares, in essence, that no criminal responsibility
will be found if the defendant, as a result of a mental disease or defect, lacks
substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirement of the law.22
The court rejected that part of the American Law Institute definition containing
the "knowledge" element of the defense23 and emphasized that part of the test
dealing with capacity to control conduct,2 4 characterizing the former as "mere
surplusage." 25 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in 1961, declared that it
would not find reversible error in any trial court's instruction to the jury if it
"embraces and requires positive findings as to three necessary elements, namely
14. Weihofen, Mental Disorder or a Criminal Defense [hereinafter cited as Welhofen]
51 (1954).
15. Id. at 81.
16. State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 382 (1871); State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869).
17. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
18. Id. at 875; see also Note, 26 Temp. L.Q. 152 (1952) (fairly typical criticism of
M'Naghten).
19. State v. Esser, 16 Wis. 2d 567, 115 N.W.2d 505 (1962); Kwosek v. State, 8
Wis. 2d 640, 100 N.W.2d 339 (1960) (Wisconsin reaffirming M'Naghten Rule).
20. McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
21. 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).
22. ld. at 774.
23. ALI test, supra note 7 (substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct).
24. Ibid. (substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law).
25. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 1961). See Mueller,
M'Naghten Remains Irreplaceable: Recent Events in the Law of Incapacity, go Geo. L.J.
105 (1961) (general criticism of M'Naghten); but see 9 U.C.I.A.L. Rev. 516 (1962)
(contending that the cognitive element is contained in the Currens standard).
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the defendant's cognition, his volition and his capacity to control his behavior.2 6
The Tenth Circuit 27 and the Second Circuit 28 have adopted the ALI test. In
United States v. Freeman the Second Circuit criticized M'Naghten: as "grossly
unrealistic" in its single track emphasis of the cognitive element of responsi-
bility.29 Adopting the ALI test the court commented: "The Model Penal Code
formulation views the mind as a unified entity and recognizes that mental
disease or defect may impair its functioning in numerous ways."3 0 The court also
noted changes or deletions from the ALI test made by other courts in other
circuits and rejected them in favor of the full official wording of the test.3 1 Other
federal circuit courts have declared that they are unable to change M'Naghten
until action by Congress or the Supreme Court 3 2 This attitude is shared by the
Supreme Court of California38 which believes that it must wait for the state
legislature to change the test, although courts in Michigan3 4 and Ohio35 have
expressed their willingness to consider a possible change. In other states,
statutory changes have been effected; the ALI test is now accepted in IllinoisP6
and Vermont3 7 ; in Maine the Durham rule has been approved"8 ; and in New
York the M'Naghten test has been slightly modified 3 9 In Wisconsin dissatisfac-
tion with the "right-wrong" test led to its deletion from the code in 1953 but
no new standard was promulgated in its place by the legislature.40 Thus the
Wisconsin courts were left to enunciate the standard for the insanity defense
and in the case of State v. Esser chose to continue with a formulation of
M'Naghten.41
Three elements, other than the actual test for criminal responsibility, can
26. Dusky v. United States, 295 F.2d 743, 759 (8th Cir. 1961).
27. Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963) (The court characterizes
the ALI test as M'Naghten plus "irresistable impluse" in more modern language.). Id. at 427.
28. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
29. Id. at 618.
30. Id. at 622.
31. Id. at 624.
32. Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640, 643 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940
(1957); accord, Howard v. United States, 232 F.2d 274, 275 (5th Cir. 1956).
33. People v. Nicolaus, - Cal. App. 2d -, 409 P.2d 193, 48 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1966).
34. People v. Krugman, 377 Mich. 559, 141 N.W.2d 33 (1966).
35. State v. Colby, 6 Ohio Misc. 19, 215 N.E.2d 65 (1966).
36. Il. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 6-2 (Smith-Hurd 1961) (wording of the ALI test adopted).
37. Vt. Stat. Ann. fit. 13, § 4801 (1958) (Vermont's variation of wording ALI test
substantially the same as the original.).
38. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 102 (1964) (Maine bases its test on the "product of
mental illness" formula.).
39. N.Y. Pen, Law § 1120 (1965). The New York rule now reads:
A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct,
as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity to know or
appreciate either:
(a) The nature and consequences of such conduct; or
(b) That such conduct was wrong.
See also Note, 40 St. John's L. Rev. 75 (1965). "By the addition of the words
'substantial capacity to know or appreciate,' it would seem that the new statute broadens
the requirement of mere 'knowledge' imposed by the M'Naghten Rule." Id. at 81. See also
Legislation, 30 Albany L. Rev. 140 (1966).
40. Platz, The Criminal Code, 1956 Wisconsin L. Rev. 350, 367-68 (1956).
41. State v. Esser, 16 Wis. 2d 567, 115 N.W.2d 505 (1962).
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have a substantial effect on the defense of insanity: first, there is the allocation
of the burden of proof; second, there is the clarity and precision with which the
instructions are given by the trial court to the jury; and third, there is the
possibility of prejudice against the plea of insanity which can have a profound
effect on every element of the defense, including the aforementioned. The juris-
dictions are split as to the allocation of the burden of proof: in the federal
courts42 and in about half the states43 the burden is on the prosecution to prove
the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, as it is in Wisconsin,4 4 or
by a preponderance of the evidence.4 5 States which place the burden of proof
on the defendant often characterize the plea as an affirmative defense40 and an
"exception" to the principle47 that it is the duty of the state to establish all
elements of the alleged offense.48 Making the plea of insanity an "exception" in
the allocation of the burden of proof may indicate judicial bias against the plea.
Second, the element of communication of the trial court's instructions has been
neglected in the insanity area, as well as in other fields: "Thus the issue has
never been how to communicate instructions; it has been what should the
instruction mean: where should the boundaries of responsibility be fixed."149
Recent jury studies indicate that there is a low rate of comprehension by the
jury of the instructions given by the trial courtr0 and that trial courts are
failing to communicate the standard for criminal responsibility to the jury.5 1
Third, there is the element of prejudice against the plea of insanity and its
effect on the defense. Juror prejudice against the insanity defense may, in some
instances, be the result of fear that the defendant will be set free should his
plea be successful. In the District of Columbia the jury is told that the defendant
must be hospitalized after a successful insanity plea. 2 In some states the jury,
after finding the defendant insane at the time of the offense, must then decide
his present sanity and the desirability of commitment.5 3 In either situation
42. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
43. Weihofen 212.
44. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 957.11(1) (1958).
45. 38 N.D.L. Rev. 340, 350 (1962).
46. Weihofen 220.
47. So regarded by, e.g., Glueck, Law and Psychiatry 118 (1962).
48. See, e.g., Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1961). "His sanity at
the time of the offense becomes an element of the crime." Id. at 854. Cf. People v. Lally,
19 N.Y.2d 27, 224 N.E.2d 87, 277 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1966).
49. James, Jurors Assessment of Criminal Responsibility, 7 Soc. Prob. 58, 59 (1959)
[hereinafter cited James].
50. Arens, Granfield & Susman, Jurors, Jury Charges and Insanity, 14 Catholic U.L. Rev.
1, 25 (1965) [hereinafter cited Arens].
51. Id. at 26.
52. Taylor v. United States, 322 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Lyles v. United States,
254 F.2d 725, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961 (1958) (The court declares that
jurors have a common understanding as to the meaning of the verdicts of guilty and not
guilty but not of the verdict not guilty by reason of insanity, so the jury should be told of
defendant's mandatory commitment.). Contra, Pope v. United States, 298 F.2d 507 (5th Cir.
1962).
53. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46.02 § 2(d-1) (1965) (supplementary finding of
present sanity or insanity required) ; but see Weihofen 365 (jury generally not informed of
defendant's future status even if there is a mandatory commitment statute).
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the possibility of juror prejudice against the insanity plea, because of fear that
the defendant will be set free to menace society, is eliminated.54 In addition to
this possibility, juror prejudice may affect other elements of the defense. For
example, it is evident that jurors tend to distrust psychiatric testimony in favor
of the defendant 55 and this feeling would make it difficult for the defendant
to create even a reasonable doubt as to his sanity.56 Finally, jurors seem to
interpret any test of criminal responsibility to meet their own preconceived
notions of the insanity defense.57 Although this may be the result of ignorance,
due to the failure of the court to communicate the standard, it would seem
to be at least partly due to juror bias.58
In considering the defense of insanity, Justice Fairchild, writing for the
"majority" 59 in the instant case, first emphasized that "the basic question facing
society" is whether, at the time of the offense, the accused was so substantially
affected by mental illness that society can not hold him responsible for his
crime.60 The court goes on to point out that although every alternative test for
criminal responsibility, including that formulated in State v. Esser,61 can be
subject to some criticism, the court had not been shown that the Esser definition,
coupled with the placing of the burden of proof on the state, had resulted in any
injustice.6 2 However, Justice Wilkie in his concurring opinion, remarked that
the reason the court has not been shown the unfairness of the Esser rule is that
in none of the records in the criminal cases involving insanity, brought before
the court since Esser, was there any effort to modify the rule and "accordingly,
there would have been nothing in any record which in any way could present
54. Krash, The Durham Rule and Judicial Administration of the Insanity Defense in
the District of Columbia, 70 Yale L.J. 905, 939 (1961) (The instruction is cited as "one
of the most important elements in the field since Durham itself.").
55. James 66. "[As one juror said:] 'I don't think there is a person sitting in this
room that if they were tried by a psychiatrist, with their background of education and their
approach that they couldn't find some kind of quirk in all of us. . . . In the same vein
another juror commented: 'As far as psychiatric testimony, I would say that a psychiatrist
could pick up any dozen people and make up some sort of an examination, the type that
they give you; and they'll find something wrong with you .... " Id. at 66.
56. Arens 23. "What was said of the law of insanity must now be said of the burden
of proof in the charges: comprehension was dramatically low." Ibid.
57. Id. at 26. "[Hlighlighting the difficulty manifest by the public in conceptualizing
mental illness [is the fact that]. The popular conception has thus been couched in terms
of bizarre behavior manifestations, suggestive of the Wild Beast Test .... " Ibid. See Arens
66. "The second point is that Durham jurors have no difficulty in construing the instructions
to suit their beliefs concerning the centrality of cognition." (Emphasis added.) Ibid.
58. James 68.
59. The court is actually split into two groups. Justices Gordon, Beilfuss and
Heffernan favor the continued use of the Esser definition of criminal responsibility, with the
burden of proof on the state. Justices Hollows, Wilkie and Chief Justice Currie would
introduce the ALI test and continue to place the burden of proof on the state. Justice
Fairchild while agreeing with the former that the Esser definition is all that a defendant is
entitled to as a matter of right, wishes to extend an "option" to the defendant to be tried
under the ALI test if he assumes the burden of proof. Justices Hollows, Wilkie and Chief
Justice Currie concur with Justice Fairchild, and thus the majority of the court approves
the granting of the option. Instant case at 463-64.
60. Instant case at 461.
61. 16 Wis. 2d 567, 115 N.W.2d 505 (1962).
62. Instant case at 461.
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the fairness of the Esser rule as against any other."0 8 Justice Fairchild then
noted with interest the recent changes in other jurisdictions, regarding the in-
sanity test applied, 64 and deplored the fact that the record before them lacked
comprehensive psychiatric testimony in terms of these other possible definitions
of insanity so as to be a convincing demonstration that the Esser definition had
failed. 5 However, the court continued, because of the complexity of the field
involved, it wished to attempt an "experiment" and extend to a defendant an
option to assume the burden of proof and be tried under the ALI test.00 Justice
Fairchild would not elaborate on what he hoped this "experiment" might achieve.
The court then explained that, although Wisconsin placed the burden of proof
on the state, 67 it could see "no good reason" why the defendant may not waive
the benefit of the rule and assume the burden.08 In dealing with the instruction
informing the jury of the mandatory hospitalization of defendant should he be
found not guilty by reason of insanity, the court noted that this was inconsistent
with the general rule that the jury should not be told of the effect of their
verdict. 9 However, because of the possibility that jurors might be biased against
the insanity plea if they think the defendant will be set free, it was felt that there
was sufficient reason for an exception to be made, 0 and therefore the court,
all justices concurring, approved the instruction.
It is difficult to see what the court in the instant case hopes to achieve with
its "experiment" in granting the defendant an option to assume the burden of
proof and be tried under the ALI test. The court did not elaborate on this point
in its decision, although there are several possible objectives that should be
considered: there is the possibility that the court wishes to see what juror
reaction will be to the more liberal ALI test. This view is supported when one
looks to the reasoning in the Esser decision where the court declared, "we are not
inclined to deem it just to acquit him because he succeeds merely in raising
a reasonable doubt of his capacity to control his acts."7' Here the court seems
to be making two assumptions that recent jury studies show to be dubious:
first they assume that it is not difficult to raise a reasonable doubt of sanity
in the minds of the jury and second they assume that the volitional control
element will be given the same weight and consideration as the cognitive element
by the jury.72 In addition to this, there would still remain the question of how
the court intends to measure the reaction of the jury. The court may look to
the number of defendants opting the ALI test and/or how many defendants are
found not guilty under that test. However, no valid conclusion can be drawn from
63. Id. at 473.
64. Ibid.
65. Id. at 463.
66. Id. at 464.
67. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 957.11(l) (1958).
68. Instant case at 465.
69. Ibid.
70. Id. at 465-66.
71. State v. Esser, 16 Wis. 2d 567, 589, 115 N.W.2d 505, 517 (1962).
72. James 68.
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these statistics. Defendants may refuse the option because they believe that the
assumption of the burden of proof is too high a price to pay. The court may look
to the ratio of defendants found not guilty under the ALI test as compared with
the number of defendants found notguilty under the Esser test, but the court
will still be unable to draw any valid conclusion from these statistics since it
cannot say, in any individual case, that the result would have been different
under another test for criminal responsibility.
The court may also be looking for a reaction bythe trial judges of Wisconsin
since they would be "the group most cognizant of instances, if any, where persons
whose conduct had been substantially affected by mental illness have been
convicted."73 It is difficult to see what form this reaction will take. The trial
judges do not have the option to give or withold the ALI test. The trial judges
will not be able to give an opinion on the reaction of the jury since they have no
better or other way of knowing if the jury's reaction would have been changed,
had a different test been applied, than does the court in the instant case.
It is further to be noted that the court, in the instant case and in Esser, was
reluctant to change the test for criminal responsibility because it felt that if the
defendant could prove that he was unable to control his conduct such a showing
would "generate 'in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt of his capacity,
to distinguish the nature and quality of his acts or to distinguish right from
wrong." 74 Thus the defendant would supposedly have the benefit of the ALI
test while still theoretically operating under M'Nagkten. This inference is
neither necessary nor likely. Such insight is not common among lay jurors nor
do they attempt to broaden the scope of definitions given them. On the contrary,
their interpretation is generally a restrictive one, in that they often seem to apply
the test for criminal responsibility by giving a limited and precise 'definition for
the terms of the test.7h
In the instant case 'the court tries to solve some of the problems it faces in
the "complex" field of insanity and criminal responsibility by "experimenting"
with new tests and formulations, evidencing a great concern with linguistic
niceties that would appear to be lost on the jury. Such experimentation is
unnecessary and unwise. The ALI test is simple, precise and thorough. It would
serve as a fair and accurate test of criminal responsibility even if the burden of
proof remained on the state. However, if the ALI test is adopted the court 'will
still be faced with 'two problems: juror prejudice76 and the difficulty of com-
municating the standard for criminal responsibility to the jury. The court has
partially dealt with the problem of juror prejudice in its adoption of the instruc-
tion informing the jury of the defendant's mandatory hospitilization following
a successful insanity plea. Though this decision represents a definite advance
73. Instant case at 461.
74. Id. at 463.
75. James 67.
76. Id. at 66. ("The following comment illustrates juror prejudice against the insanity
plea: 'I think we all agree that insanity has been abused a lot.' ")
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there are still manifestations of juror prejudice to be dealt with which need
study and "experimentation." It has been suggested that training for jury
service would help meet the problem of juror prejudice but even this suggestion
would only be meaningful as part of a comprehensive effort by the courts.7 7 The
element of communication also needs the consideration of the courts; for example
an "experiment" with written instructions might prove fruitful.7 8 In would seem
that there are possibilities for more productive experiments in the field of
criminal responsibility than that found in the instant case.
JAMES M. VAN DE WATER
CRIMINAL LAW-PUNISHMENT-IMPRISONMENT OF INDIGENT FOR
NoN-PAYMENT OF A FINE UNCONSTITUTIONAL IF EXTENDED BEYOND MAXIMUM
STATUTORY SENTENCE
Subsequent to a plea of guilty to the misdemeanor of assault in the third
degree, defendant Saffore was given the maximum sentence allowed by law: 1
a five hundred dollar fine in addition to imprisonment for one year. Non-
payment of the fine was to result in one day imprisonment for each dollar
remaining unpaid upon completion of the one year of incarceration.2 It is
undisputed that the sentencing court was cognizant of the defendant's inability
to pay the fine: because of his indigency the trial court, the Appellate Division,
and the Court of Appeals granted the defendant's motion to have counsel
assigned to him. The effect of the complete sentence was to incarcerate
Saffore for at least eight months (assuming time off for good behavior) 8 plus
an additional five hundred days, for a crime for which the legislature had im-
posed a maximum one year term of imprisonment. The Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision4 and an appeal was taken
by permission. The Court of Appeals held, when payment of a fine is "im-
possible" and known by the court to be "impossible," imprisonment to work
out the fine, if it results in total imprisonment of more than one year for a
misdemeanor, is unauthorized by the Code of Criminal Procedure and violates
the defendant's right to equal protection of the law and the constitutional ban
77. Arens 27.
78. Ibid.
1. N.Y. Pen. Law § 245 provides, "Assault in the third degree is punishable by im-
prisonment for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars,
or both."
2. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 484, 718 provide "A judgment that the defendant pay a
fine may also direct that he be imprisoned until the fine be satisfied, specifying the extent
of the imprisonment, which cannot exceed one day for every one dollar of the fine."
3. See N.Y. Correc. Law § 230.
4. People v. Saffore, 25 A.D.2d 496, 267 N.Y.S.2d 314 (4th Dep't 1966).
